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BODDIE v. CONNECTICUT AND THE
NEBRASKA STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
An indigent, even though he may have suffered the most
grievous injuries and have the most obvious right to redress for
his injuries, may not be able to enter the court system. Even when
an indigent can find an attorney to handle the case, the filing fee
and the service of process fee often stand as insurmountable bar-
riers which effectively bar the indigent from the court room. This,
however, is no longer the plight of the indigent in Nebraska due
to the recent passage of a comprehensive in forma pauperis statute.'
The passage of this in forma pauperis statute was prompted in part
by the recent expansion of constitutional in forma pauperis. An
understanding of constitutional in forma pauperis is therefore es-
sential for an understanding of the Nebraska statute.
II. BACKGROUND
The constitutional right to proceed in forna pauperis, founded
on the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was originally limited to felony defendants,2 but as
the case law grew, its application expanded from felony to all
criminal proceedings.3 Because this concept had not been applied
to civil cases the courts began using a civil-criminal distinction to
determine when a constitutional right of in forma pauperis existed.4
This civil-criminal distinction became blurred as the interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment was broadened to include coram
nobis5 and habeus corpus6 proceedings. The concept of a criminal
action in the civil-criminal distinction was thus expanded to include
any action in which a person's freedom from incarceration is the
primary subject. Nevertheless, the civil-criminal distinction has
been discredited by the extension of in forma pauperis in the case of
Boddie v. Connecticut.7
1 L.B. 1120, 82d Neb. Leg. Sess., 2d Sess. (1972). L.B. 1120 was passed
with an emergency clause by a vote of 46-0-3 on March 21, 1972. It
was signed into law on March 22, 1972 by Governor J. James Exon.
2 Griffn v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
3 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 92 S. Ct. 410 (1971).
4 Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1026 (5th Cir. 1969).
5 Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
6 Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969).
7 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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III. BODDIE v. CONNECTICUT
Mrs. Boddie sought a divorce in Connecticut. Her attempts to
file and to obtain service of process were frustrated by her inability
to pay the statutory fee. The state court would not waive either
the filing or the service of process fee because Connecticut did not
have an in forma pauperis statute. Mrs. Boddie then brought suit
in federal court seeking a judgment declaring such filing and service
of process fee statutes unconstitutional as applied to indigents in
divorce cases. She also sought injunctive relief against the state
officials.8
Following an adverse decision9 Mrs. Boddie perfected an appeal
to the United States Supreme Court. The Court in a majority opin-
ion by Justice Harlan held that the combination of (1) the "funda-
mental" 10 importance of divorce and (2) the resort to a court as
an "exclusive precondition"'1 to the adjustment of this interest raises
the due process right to be heard. State action, absent a counter-
vailing and overriding interest, denying a person access to its courts
solely because of inability to pay is a denial of the right to be heard
and is therefore unconstitutional. 12
There are three subjects which need to be examined more fully
in light of the holding in Boddie: (1) civil cases; (2) indigency;
(3) costs.
A. CIVL CASES
Justice Harlan started with the proposition that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a person who is
forced into court a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."'13 The
defendant in any type of action must be given an opportunity to
be heard because he is forced to defend his interests in court.1
4
Plaintiffs are not usually deemed to possess the protection of the
due process clause grant of an opportunity to be heard because
there are alternatives to invocation of the court system for settle-
ment of private disputes.15 However, the plaintiff in an action for
divorce is in a position similar to a defendant because of the state
monopoly over the means of marriage dissolution.
8 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968).
9 Id. at 974.
10 401 U.S. at 383 (1971).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 374.
13 Id. at 377.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 375.
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Thus, although they assert here due process rights as would-be
plaintiffs, we think appellant's plight, because resort to the state
courts is the only avenue to dissolution of their marriages, is akin
to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum
effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to the judi-
cial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic
sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests
in court. For both groups this process is not only the paramount
dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one.' 6
JTustice Harlan labeled this as an "exclusive precondition." 17 Be-
cause of this and the "fundamental"' 8 nature of divorce, the due
process right to be heard extends to the divorce plaintiff.
However, Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion questioned
the validity of the distinction between the plaintiff in a divorce
proceeding and a plaintiff in other civil actions.
A State has an ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and at-
tendant enforcement machinery. As a practical matter, if disputes
cannot be successfully settled between the parties, the court system
is usually [quoting the majority opinion] "the only forum effec-
tively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to tfi& judicial
process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic sense
than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in
court."19
Justice Brennan goes on to state that "The right to be heard in
some way at some time extends to all proceedings entertained by
courts. The possible distinctions suggested by the Court today will
not withstand analysis.
'20
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, felt that the case
should have been decided under the equal protection clause which
bans any invidious discrimination based on poverty.21 Justice Doug-
las also objected to the notion that due process may be premised
upon a notion of "fundamental" importance. He felt that this would
be a revival of the highly subjective due process interpretation
which has been discarded.
22
Justice Black, dissenting in this and a subsequent opinion,23 felt
that the Court was overruling Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
16 Id. at 376-77.
17 Id. at 383.
I8 Id.
'e Id. at 387.
20 Id. at 387-88.
21 Id. at 385.
22 Id. at 384.
23 Meltzer v. C. Buck & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971) (order of the Supreme
Court after the Boddie decision denying certiorari in eight cases seek-
ing relief on similar grounds).
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Corp.24 and thereby doing away with the civil-criminal distinction
altogether. Without the civil-criminal distinction there is no rea-
sonable classification, and therefore all civil cases come under the
protection of the due process clause. Justice Black reasoned that a
divorce could not be distinguished from other civil actions because
it involved a "fundamental" interest.
Society generally places a high value on marriage and a low value
on the right to divorce. And since Boddie held that the right to
divorce was 'fundamental," I can only conclude that almost every
other kind of legally enforceable right is also fundamental to our
society.25
Black also reasoned that the "'exclusiveness' of the judicial process
as a remedy is no limitation at all. The States and the Federal
Government hold the ultimate power of enforcement in almost
every dispute.
'26
The power of the criticisms by Justice Black and Justice Douglas
of the "fundamental" interest requirement cannot be denied. Not
only is such a requirement arbitrary and lacking in any possible
constitutional precision,27 but it is also contrary to prior holdings
of the court.28 The fundamental interest requirement should not
stand.
The "exclusive precondition" requirement must also be criticised
for vagueness and lack of clarity. Justice Harlan seems to say in
his opinion that when no available "recognized, effective" alterna-
tive means of private dispute settlement other than the court sys-
tem remain, then the indigent plaintiff has a right to be heard. As
Justice Brennan and Justice Black have pointed out, almost every
case would meet these criteria. On the other hand, a possible con-
struction of "exclusive precondition" would be that the formality
of judicial approval was mandatory for the resolution of that par-
ticular problem.30 Such a construction would not only be an
24 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
25 402 U.S. 954, 957-58 (1971).
26 Id. at 956.
27 401 U.S. 371, 393 (1971).
28 Id. at 384.
29 "Recognized" in the context of the majority opinion appears to mean
that the method of private dispute settlement must be a legitimate
means provided by law. "Effective" would seem to mean that the
method of dispute settlement would give a result acceptable to both
parties or be final and binding on both parties.
30 "Even if 'exclusive precondition' meant that the formality of judicial
approval was mandatory, the Boddie rationale would go far beyond
divorce. Citizens generally must resort to courts for adoptions, to
probate a will, to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, for child custody
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arbitrary enforcement of due process but also contrary to the
language in Justice Harlan's opinion. Unfortunately it does not
appear which construction the court is using. Nevertheless, in
form pauperis has been expanding under the Boddie doctrine s l
B. INDIGENCY
In Boddie v. Connecticut there was no dispute as to Irs. Boddie's
inability to pay the filing and service of process fees.8 2 The Court,
therefore, did not have to decide the issue. Unfortunately, it ap-
pears that the Supreme Court has never defined indigency or inabil-
ity to pay. 3 The federal courts have developed a definition of in-
ability to pay or indigency for the purpose of determining a criminal
defendant's due process right to be heard. The court in Bramlett v.
Peterson 4 stated a test for determing indigency: "A finding of
inability to pay counsel must be made if at the time of the determi-
nation the accused is substantially inhibited by a lack of means."3 5
The concern is that an assertion of a right or claim will be inhibited
by the fee or cost. If the assertion of the right or claim is substan-
tially inhibited, then the fee or cost must be waived. What is a
substantial inhibition of an assertion of a right?
determinations, to clear title to land in rem, to obtain an adjudication
of incompetency, to change a name, and other matters. It would be
extremely arbitrary to limit Boddie to these particular kinds of dis-
putes." 402 U.S. 954, 957 n. 2 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
31 In forima pauperis was extended to hearings on bankruptcy under the
Boddie doctrine in In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) and
In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Ore. 1971). But see In re Garland,
428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970).
32 401 U.S. at 372.
33 "A difficulty we encounter at the outset is defining indigence. The
Supreme Court has not to our knowledge ever defined the term, al-
though the court has used it in literally hundreds of decisions. It is
true that the Supreme Court and numerous lower courts have con-
strued the meaning of indigence as used in the federal in forma
pauperis statute,... and in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, ... but
these cases are not much help in defining indigence in the constitu-
tional sense.... In only one case we have found has the Supreme
Court ruled that a particular petitioner was indigent in the constitu-
tional sense and therefore entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in a
criminal case. Seals v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 254, . . . (1965) .... The
court's five-line per curiam decision states a holding but does not give
any reasons in support of it." In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1091
(D. Colo. 1971).
34 307 F. Supp. 1311 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
35 Id. at 1324; See Whittington v. Gaither, 272 F. Supp. 507, 512 (N.D.
Tex. 1967).
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The court in Ivey v. Holman,36 in determining the substantial
inhibition of an assertion of a right, stated: "The general principles
therein stated [Adkins v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Ca.3 7 ] with refer-
ence to indigency are applicable upon the question of a defendant
being entitled to the appointment of counsel. ' '38 In the Adkins case
the Supreme Court construed the federal in forma pauperis statute
and developed a working definition of indigency for its application:
the indigent does not have to be impoverished to fie in forma
pauperis; he must only show that he cannot pay the costs and at the
same time still provide himself with the necessities of life.39
A similar definition of inability to pay was reached by the court
in In re Smith.40 The court set out a constitutional definition of
indigency for the purpose of determining the due process and equal
protection rights of persons filing in bankruptcy.
[WIe think it fair to state that a person who cannot afford to live
from day to day and also pay the cost of a court filing fee is in-
digent.... To require that a person seeking access to court be so
destitute as to be unable to maintain himself from day to day
would deny access as surely as does the filing fee requirement.4 1
Maintenance from day to day would seem to mean that the
affiant would not have to miss a rent payment and risk eviction,
mortgage a home,42 or sell meager possessions (grave site, automo-
bile or household furnishings).43 "The public would not be profited
if relieved of paying costs of a particular litigation only to have
imposed on it the expense of supporting the person thereby made
an object of public support."44
Taken together these cases provide a constitutional minimum
standard: if, at the time when the plaintiff attempts to assert a
right or claim, the amount of the fee or cost would deprive him or
his family of any of their necessities or otherwise make him unable
to maintain himself or his family from day to day, then the fee or
cost is a substantial inhibition of his right to be heard and must
be set aside.
36 222 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
37 335 U.S. 331 (1948).
38 222 F. Supp. 869, 870 n. 2 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
39 335 U.S. at 339 (1948).
40 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
41 Id. at 1092.
42 Adkins v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 335 U.S. 331, 335 (1948).
43 In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1092 (D. Colo. 1971).
44 Adkins v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).
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C. COSTS
There are essentially two types of costs: (1) the expenses of
litigation payable to a public officer, and (2) the expenses of
litigation payable to persons other than public officers. The court
has the power to control public servants and may therefore enjoin
a clerk, sheriff or court reporter from collecting costs from an
indigent where there is a conflict with due process.4 5 But the court
faces a more difficult problem with the second category of costs.
Courts do not have the power to order a newspaper to print a
service of process without compensation or to compel private
service associations to perform without charge.46 On the other hand,
the expenditure of public monies is considered to be the exclusive
domain of the legislature. 47 Generally, courts are not considered to
be empowered to order expenditures without special legislative
sanction.48 It is equally clear from Boddie that any requirement for
a cost of the second category must be waived by the state when
it is in conflict with the indigent plaintiff's right to be heard. In
Boddie the plaintiff had to at least be given the opportunity to
perfect service by registered mail and posted notice.4 9 But without
a legislative appropriation the court can go no further than to
waive the public officers' cost requirement.50
IV. NEBRASKA'S IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUTE
Since it had been recognized that constitutional in forma pauperis
was expanding to civil cases as well as criminal cases, a compre-
hensive in forma pauperis statute was drafted for presentation to
the Nebraska Unicameral. 1 The statute which has been passed is
designed to cover all types of cases before all courts in the State of
Nebraska, conform to the constitutional standards of indigency
45 Jeffreys v. Jeifreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
46 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "No person shall .. . be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
47 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109 (1900).
48 In re Karren, 276 Minn. 554, 150 N.W.2d 24 (1967).
49 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
50 Contrary to Black's opinion that all costs, including attorney fees,
must be provided, there is a difference between telling a state that
it cannot convict a person unless the elements of an adequate defense
are provided and telling a state to pay for publication in a newspaper.
The court can let a criminal go free, but it cannot force a legislature
to appropriate money.
51 L.B. 1120, 82d Neb. Leg. Sess., 2d Sess. (1972) was originally drafted
by the Lincoln Legal Services for presentation to the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the Nebraska Legislature.
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developed in case law,52 and cover all necessary costs. The Ne-
braska statute is set out below by individual section with corres-
ponding explanatory text53 and criticism.
LEGISLATIVE BILL 112054
Section 1. Any court of the State of Nebraska, or of any county or
municipality shall authorize the commencement, prosecution or de-
fense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security, by a per-
son who makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or
give security. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action,
defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court
certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.
Section one prescribes the method for petitioning the court for
authorization to proceed in forma pauperis. The comparable section
in the federal in forma pauperis statute has been construed by the
Supreme Court to mean that when the affidavit is in the language
of the statute it should ordinarily be accepted unless questioned by
the opposing party or perceived by the judge to be a flagrant
misrepresentation. 5 The general affidavit serves two purposes: (1)
procedurally it lightens the burden on the court because it is
unnecessary to have a hearing on every affidavit; (2) it avoids
arbitrary and borderline decisions which deny worthy afflants the
right to proceed. 56 The use of a general affidavit tends to insure
liberality as well as uniformity of treatment for all afflants.
There may be some question as to whether a bond is covered
under the provisions of section one. However, a bond is a type of
security and should be covered by this section.
The statute also commendably takes the further step, possibly
not required by the due process or equal protection clauses, of
providing an appeal in forma pauperis. The second paragraph of
52 Supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
53 A similar explanatory text was prepared by the author of this note
for the use of the Judiciary Committee of the Nebraska Legislature
when L.B. 1120 was introduced. Any criticism has been subsequently
added.
54 The primary source used in drafting this statute was the federal in
forma pauperis statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
55 Adkins v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948); Gift
Stars, Inc. v. Alexander, 245 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
56 Adkins v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948). See
Note, Poverty In Federal In Forma Pauperis Proceedings and as a
Requirement for Legal Aid, 1950 WIs. L. REv. 734.
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section one reduces the possibility of an appeal for improper pur-
poses at the expense of the public.57
Section 2. In any civil or criminal case the court shall, upon filing
of a like affidavit, direct the responsible officer of the court to issue
and serve all the necessary writs, process and proceedings, and
perform all such duties without charge.
Section two is a codification of the inherent power of the court
to control its officers. 58 This section applies mainly to clerks,
sheriffs and court reporters. However, special compensation is
made for the preparation of transcripts in section six of this statute.
Section 3. In any civil or criminal case the court shall, upon the
filing of a like affidavit, direct that the expense of process by pub-
lication, if such process is required by the court, be paid by the
county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
Section three is intended to give the court the option to substi-
tute a cheaper service of process where applicable. Payment for
service of process by publication would at least be made where
other means of service prove to be unsuccessful.
Section 4. In any civil or criminal case the court may, upon the
filing of a like affidavit, order witnesses to be subpoenaed, if the
court finds that they have evidence material and necessary to the
case, and that they are within the judicial district in which the
court is held, or within one hundred miles of the place of trial. In
such case the process and the fees of the witnesses shall be paid
by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
Section four expressly states two conditions that have to be met
before a witness may be called. The first condition is that the
evidence the witness would give is "material and necessary." If
other sufficient evidence is available to prove the fact then the
witness may not be called by the court. Secondly, the evidence to
be presented must be essential to the development of the case.
These conditions insure that only the most necessary expenditures
will be made. Surely there are enough safeguards in this section
to make it unnecessary to give a judge the discretionary power to
refuse to call the witness. It may be of no practical difference since
it would probably be an abuse of discretion to refuse to call a
witness who meets the requirements of this section. The provision
for restriction of the area 9 from which a witness may be called
57 But see Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214, 215 (1958) where in a
criminal appeal a statute providing for a transcript "if in his [the
judge's] opinion justice will thereby be promoted" was struck down.
58 See note 45 and accompanying text, supra.
59 The source for this limitation is CoLo. REv. STAT. AN. § 39-7-29
(1963).
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may prove to be too restrictive. In any case, that provision should
be interpreted to mean that a witness within either area may be
called. This would allow witnesses to be called from within large
judicial districts and from other judicial districts if within one
hundred miles of the forum district. To avoid any undue hardship
the "place of trial" could be interpreted to include the entire judicial
district, not merely the site of the courthouse.
Section 5. In any civil or criminal case the court shall, upon filing
of a like affidavit, direct that the expenses of printing the record
on appeal, if such printing is required by the appellate court, be
paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
Section five encourages substitutes for printing of the record on
appeal. If other alternatives are not made available then the
printing will be paid.
60
Section 6. In any civil or criminal case the court shall, upon filing
of a like affidavit, order transcripts to be furnished without cost if
the suit or appeal is not frivolous, but presents a substantial ques-
tion, and if the transcript is needed to prepare, present or decide
the issue presented by the suit or appeal. Such costs shall be paid
by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.61
Section six allows the transcript to be furnished only when a
substantial legal question is involved, and the issue cannot be pre-
sented without the transcript. This prevents unnecessary prepara-
tion of transcripts at public expense.
Section 7. In any civil or criminal case on appeal, upon the filing
of a like affidavit, the court shall direct that the expense of printing
of the appellate briefs, if such printing is required by the court, be
paid by the county in the same manner as other claims are paid.
Section 8. The court may dismiss the case or permit the afflant to
proceed upon payment of costs if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
Section eight is primarily intended to prevent abuse of the in
forma pauperis provision. The discretionary word "may" is used
in order to allow for compensation of non-substantive errors in the
allegation of poverty where it appears that the affiant would never-
theless be entitled to proceed in forma pauperis under section one
of this act. The term "frivolous" is used in the sense that the
court should examine merely whether the claim states a cause of
action. The case should be dismissed only if it is so frivolous that
60 On the subject of alternatives to transcripts, bills of exceptions and
printing of the record on appeal see Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487 (1963).
61 This section was adopted from 28 U.S.C. § 753 (f) (1965).
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it would be dismissed in the case of a non-indigent litigant.62 How-
ever, when the court finds that the affiant is not entitled to proceed
in forma pauperis under section one, it has the discretion of: (1)
dismissing the case and forcing the plaintiff to start over; or (2)
allowing the case to be continued after payment of costs. In de-
termining which of these alternatives to use the court should con-
sider the time and costs already incurred. Thus a case nearing
judgment should not be as readily dismissed as a case in its
formative stages.
Section 9. In the event any person prosecutes or defends an action
or proceeding in forma pauperis successfully, any and all cost de-
ferred by the court under the provisions of this act shall be first
satisfied out of any money paid in satisfaction of judgment.
Section ten provides for cost recoupment when the afflant is
successful. This section does leave one important question unan-
swered. Are the costs paid by the county taxable to the losing
party as in other actions? It would seem logical that those costs
paid by the county which are normally taxable to the losing party
should be so taxed. Otherwise, a heavier burden would be placed
upon a successful indigent than on other litigants. Those costs
normally not awarded should then be satisfied out of any judgment.
This construction of the statute would leave the litigants in the
same position that they now occupy at the end of trial under our
cost system.
Section 10. Anyone who fraudulently invokes the privileges of this
act shall be guilty of perjury and shall, upon conviction thereof, be
punished as provided in section 28-701, Reissue Revised Statutes
of Nebraska, 1943.
Section 11. Since an emergency exists, this act shall be in full force
and take effect, from and after its passage and approval, according
to law.
V. CONCLUSION
Nebraska has enacted one of the most comprehensive in forma
pauperis provisions in the United States. It covers costs in all
proceedings before all courts in the State of Nebraska, with only
one notable exception-attorney fees. Hopefully this gap will even-
tually be filled. In the meantime, Nebraska can be proud that it
has taken the initiative to insure that all persons, regardless of
wealth, are indeed equal before the law.
Dennis J. Burnett '73
62 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958). See Note, In Forma
Pauperis and the Civil Litigant, 19 CATH. U. L. REv. 191, 195 (1965).
